meta_epist ([info]meta_epist) wrote,

A solution to the problem of freewill (at least it seemed like a solution in the shower)

Ok, so the problem of freewill involves the apparent incompatibility of an willful agent in an universe in which the agent's actions are determined by factors beyond her control. Determination here can be thought of nomologically (as it is standardly claimed). Nomological just means law-like. Physical laws are paradigmatic nomological regularities. You can throw in other laws of nature if you'd like (e.g., biology, chemistry and *gasp* psychology). But, laws of nature relate things (events or whatever) that are part of the theory of the laws. So, physical laws contain things in physics and biological laws contain biological entities. Here is the upshot: a willful agent is NOT an entity of any law I know of. So, there are no laws of nature such that willful agents are part of its nomological constituent. Two things: (1) I am assuming (and I think I can argue for this) that willful agents cannot be reduced (nomologically?) to some entities in a lower level science (say, biology or physics) and (2) that does not mean the laws of physics are not closed. In other words, laws of physics tell us everything there is to know concerning physical objects but if willful agents are not an entity in the ontology of physics, then physical laws' inability to account for them does not entail the failure of physics.

So, there is no incompatibility! Done.

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[info]zach23

September 11 2005, 06:47:21 UTC 6 years ago

I think this is a very interesting approach, but I have something of an objection. The inability of physics to account for objects not included in its underlying ontology does not entail a failure in physics because the system is internally consistent.

Now consider the metaphysical system we're trying to construct. We want to include willful agents in our ontology so we can hand out blame and praise and so forth. But at the same time, we want to include science, specifically physics, because we like the idea that we can actually describe nomologically the phenomena we experience. However, this system fails because of the inconsistency between willful agents and the determinism that physics brings into the picture. So, while physics itself might be internally consistent, the wider metaphysical system we're trying to put together is not.

The point is, even if physics as such does not contain willful agents in its ontology, a metaphysical theory that presuppose physics *and* includes willful agents in its ontology will end up being internally inconsistent. That brings us back to the problem we had to begin with. Drop the willful agents or drop physics. Otherwise the incompatibility remains and our theory is inconsistent.

Thoughts?

[info]gruebleen

September 11 2005, 14:35:22 UTC 6 years ago

Yeah yeah yeah!

OK, good shit. Here is what I am thinking:

A standard view of physics is that it is closed in the sense that it tells us (explains? accounts for?) all there is. Jaegwon Kim, however, has proposed a different understanding of physicalism that says physics tells us all there is about physical things. Its failure to say anything about non-physical things is not a failure of physicalism. Kim has qualia in mind. I am thinking the upper sciences or even ordinary ontology or folk-psychology is autonomous in the sense that (a) they cannot be reduced to the lower sciences (e.g., physics) and (b) they have laws (I used the phrase "projectable regularities" in my dissertation) that roughly guide their regularities. So, a willful agent is not going to be a part of the discourse of physics. In other words, when physics is complete, we won't find willful agents in it. There is of course the possibility of a reductive account; willful agents are just XYZ (in physics). But, I doubt it. So, since physical laws relate physical things, willful agents are not going to be a part of any physical laws. The apparent incompatibility between physical determinism and willful agents does not exist. However, we can say that there might be upper level laws that involve willful agents. So far we have none and until we have some, there is no threat. More importantly, I am holding out hope that there won't be any. The best that we can do is some statistical generalizations that involve no metaphysical omph but only allow us to make some educated guesses. Willful agents live and freewill live, blah.

What da ya think?

[info]mrdooz

September 11 2005, 15:33:16 UTC 6 years ago

Re: Yeah yeah yeah!

i think i'd be a lot more comfortable with this if i heard some explanation for why we can reasonably doubt the possibility of the 'reductive account' of willful agents as just XYZ in physics.

[info]tatermoog

September 12 2005, 02:47:39 UTC 6 years ago

Yeah, seems a bit unconvincing. I like the concept, but it would be difficult to disconnect "free agency" from the realm of "physics" for most determinists. It's a solution, yes, but I don't know if I find it a convincing solution.

Damned if I have a better one, though. And I personally like the concept of disassociating the two areas.

[info]gruebleen

September 12 2005, 05:23:28 UTC 6 years ago

Damn it! You people are hard to please. OK, I will run through it on Tuesday.

[info]taychung

September 12 2005, 16:39:16 UTC 6 years ago

hahahaha...

I actually liked the idea, but for it to be convincing enough you'll probably really have to hit your "physical laws/things (relation)" hard. Can't wait for Tuesdays class now.

Hope I didn't "pai ma pi" in my post here too much just my thoughts.

Anonymous

September 12 2005, 21:09:32 UTC 6 years ago

Taylor trying to impress the teach with his Chinese. So sad.

[info]taychung

September 13 2005, 12:06:05 UTC 6 years ago

Touche Stephen errr Anonymous, in my post I said I was "brown nosing" IN Chinese goober ;) rofl do I sense a hint of jealousy? I would like to be in that Chinese room we discussed in class though...

[info]taychung

September 13 2005, 12:08:19 UTC 6 years ago

Oh yeah, and FREEWILL rules!

[info]gruebleen

September 13 2005, 13:23:30 UTC 6 years ago

Anonymous postings are written by gutless pieces of shit. Oh wait, that's kind of mean, I should probably make this anonymous.

Anonymous

September 14 2005, 01:48:45 UTC 6 years ago

It occurs to me that a proponent of determinism wouldn't be bothered by your challenge that there are no "Laws of Nature" pertaining to wilful agents. Such a person would merely argue that wilful agents don't exist.

Anonymous

September 14 2005, 01:49:12 UTC 6 years ago

Chris Mills, by the way.

[info]mrdooz

September 14 2005, 02:07:05 UTC 6 years ago

i had the same thought today. seems to me to make sense that humans are physical things, thus wholly within the scope of the 'laws' of nature. this goes back to something we mentioned during one of the first classes, and i've been trying to figure out why we havn't revisited the idea. when we talked about making mundane decisions like whether to use your index or middle finger to scratch your forehead, we said the proponent of determinism would tack it up to things in our environment that have helped, if silently, to develop us. in the case of the fried chicken vs. the veggie dog we can even talk about autonomous functions of the *physical* body that we aren't even aware of like metabolism. i guess i just don't find it too far fetched to claim that we're nothing more than physical creatures in a physical world. it may just so have happened that our intellectual capacity has developed to such a greater degree than any other creature on earth that we're the only ones capable of questioning things like our being and free will. thoughts?
love,
other chris

[info]mrdooz

September 14 2005, 19:21:02 UTC 6 years ago

sorry, i was a little scattered. the last part about the development of human intellect just meant that maybe that accounts for our inclination to believe we're free agents.

Anonymous

September 22 2005, 23:39:18 UTC 6 years ago

LOL!!!
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