Ok, so the problem of freewill involves the apparent incompatibility of an willful agent in an universe in which the agent's actions are determined by factors beyond her control. Determination here can be thought of nomologically (as it is standardly claimed). Nomological just means law-like. Physical laws are paradigmatic nomological regularities. You can throw in other laws of nature if you'd like (e.g., biology, chemistry and *gasp* psychology). But, laws of nature relate things (events or whatever) that are part of the theory of the laws. So, physical laws contain things in physics and biological laws contain biological entities. Here is the upshot: a willful agent is NOT an entity of any law I know of. So, there are no laws of nature such that willful agents are part of its nomological constituent. Two things: (1) I am assuming (and I think I can argue for this) that willful agents cannot be reduced (nomologically?) to some entities in a lower level science (say, biology or physics) and (2) that does not mean the laws of physics are not closed. In other words, laws of physics tell us everything there is to know concerning physical objects but if willful agents are not an entity in the ontology of physics, then physical laws' inability to account for them does not entail the failure of physics.
So, there is no incompatibility! Done.
| | meta_epist ( |
September 11 2005, 06:47:21 UTC 6 years ago
Now consider the metaphysical system we're trying to construct. We want to include willful agents in our ontology so we can hand out blame and praise and so forth. But at the same time, we want to include science, specifically physics, because we like the idea that we can actually describe nomologically the phenomena we experience. However, this system fails because of the inconsistency between willful agents and the determinism that physics brings into the picture. So, while physics itself might be internally consistent, the wider metaphysical system we're trying to put together is not.
The point is, even if physics as such does not contain willful agents in its ontology, a metaphysical theory that presuppose physics *and* includes willful agents in its ontology will end up being internally inconsistent. That brings us back to the problem we had to begin with. Drop the willful agents or drop physics. Otherwise the incompatibility remains and our theory is inconsistent.
Thoughts?
September 11 2005, 14:35:22 UTC 6 years ago
Yeah yeah yeah!
OK, good shit. Here is what I am thinking:A standard view of physics is that it is closed in the sense that it tells us (explains? accounts for?) all there is. Jaegwon Kim, however, has proposed a different understanding of physicalism that says physics tells us all there is about physical things. Its failure to say anything about non-physical things is not a failure of physicalism. Kim has qualia in mind. I am thinking the upper sciences or even ordinary ontology or folk-psychology is autonomous in the sense that (a) they cannot be reduced to the lower sciences (e.g., physics) and (b) they have laws (I used the phrase "projectable regularities" in my dissertation) that roughly guide their regularities. So, a willful agent is not going to be a part of the discourse of physics. In other words, when physics is complete, we won't find willful agents in it. There is of course the possibility of a reductive account; willful agents are just XYZ (in physics). But, I doubt it. So, since physical laws relate physical things, willful agents are not going to be a part of any physical laws. The apparent incompatibility between physical determinism and willful agents does not exist. However, we can say that there might be upper level laws that involve willful agents. So far we have none and until we have some, there is no threat. More importantly, I am holding out hope that there won't be any. The best that we can do is some statistical generalizations that involve no metaphysical omph but only allow us to make some educated guesses. Willful agents live and freewill live, blah.
What da ya think?
September 11 2005, 15:33:16 UTC 6 years ago
Re: Yeah yeah yeah!
i think i'd be a lot more comfortable with this if i heard some explanation for why we can reasonably doubt the possibility of the 'reductive account' of willful agents as just XYZ in physics.September 12 2005, 02:47:39 UTC 6 years ago
Damned if I have a better one, though. And I personally like the concept of disassociating the two areas.
September 12 2005, 05:23:28 UTC 6 years ago
September 12 2005, 16:39:16 UTC 6 years ago
I actually liked the idea, but for it to be convincing enough you'll probably really have to hit your "physical laws/things (relation)" hard. Can't wait for Tuesdays class now.
Hope I didn't "pai ma pi" in my post here too much just my thoughts.
Anonymous
September 12 2005, 21:09:32 UTC 6 years ago
September 13 2005, 12:06:05 UTC 6 years ago
September 13 2005, 12:08:19 UTC 6 years ago
September 13 2005, 13:23:30 UTC 6 years ago
Anonymous
September 14 2005, 01:48:45 UTC 6 years ago
Anonymous
September 14 2005, 01:49:12 UTC 6 years ago
September 14 2005, 02:07:05 UTC 6 years ago
love,
other chris
September 14 2005, 19:21:02 UTC 6 years ago
Anonymous
September 22 2005, 23:39:18 UTC 6 years ago